Research has shown that lateral chromatic aberrations (LCA), an imaging ngerprint, can be anti-forensically modi ed to hide evidence of cut-and-paste forgery. In this paper, we propose a new technique for securing digital images against anti-forensic manipulation of LCA. To do this, we exploit resizing di erences between color channels, which are induced by LCA anti-forensics, and de ne a feature vector to quantitatively capture these di erences. Furthermore, we propose a detection method that exposes anti-forensically manipulated image patches. e technique algorithm is validated through experimental procedure, showing dependence on forgery patch size as well as anti-forensic scaling factor.
INTRODUCTION
Tampered digital images have become increasingly prevalent in today's society. O en, image forgers will manipulate the content of an image to maliciously alter its meaning. Since many facets of society rely upon authentic digital information, such as courts of law and media outlets, it necessary to ensure that images are truthful and haven't undergone manipulation. Image authenticity is veri ed using forensic methods that operate by detecting imperceptible traces, or ngerprints, le behind by the tampering process [16] .
In response to multimedia forensics, techniques that hide or obfuscate tampering ngerprints have become common. ese methods, called anti-forensics, operate by masking the traces that are inherently le behind during a tampering process. is fools forensic techniques into perceiving that a tampered image is authentic. For example, anti-forensic methods have been developed to hide traces of, median ltering [20] , resampling [4, 8] , JPEG compression [15] , sensor noise [4] , and lateral chromatic aberrations [11] .
Anti-forensics, however, threaten societal con dence in both digital multimedia content and in forensic authentication algorithms. ey do this by preventing multimedia content from being accurately authenticated. erefore, it is crucial to also be able to secure images against anti-forensic methods. One way to do this is Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. to detect traces that are le behind by the anti-forensic processes themselves. Research has shown that many anti-forensic techniques leave behind their own traces that can be detected, such as with anti-forensic tampering of median ltering [23] , resampling [13] , JPEG compression [1, 10, 18] , and sensor noise [5] .
Research has shown that localized inconsistencies in lateral chromatic aberrations (LCA) can be used to detect cut-and-paste image forgeries [6, 12, 21] , where content from one image is inserted into another image to change its meaning. LCA is an imaging trace present in optical imaging systems. It is introduced by the inability of lenses to focus all wavelengths from a single point source in a scene to a single focal point on the sensor.
is manifests as imperceptible color fringes about object edges in an image. LCA pa erning is also used to identify source camera model [19] and source imaging lens [22] .
Work in anti-forensics, however, has shown that the chromatic aberrations in cut-and-paste forgeries can be anti-forensically altered to hide traces of manipulation [11] . Mayer and Stamm proposed an anti-forensic technique that independently scales and shi s the forged content's color channels to induce speci c spatial relationships of focal points across color channels.
e induced focal point relationships alters the forged LCA trace to be consistent with an authentic image. As a result, evidence of cut-and-paste manipulation are anti-forensically hidden.
In this paper, we propose a new forensic ngerprint to expose anti-forensic manipulations of lateral chromatic aberrations. Currently, there are no known forensic traces that can detect antiforensics of LCA. Our proposed ngerprint exploits di erences in resizing between color channels, which are introduced during the anti-forensic manipulation of LCA. To do this, we extract spectral properties of resampling artifacts.
en, we examine amplitude and phase angle di erences across color channels at frequencies related to JPEG blocking discontinuities in precompressed images. We use these amplitude and phase angle di erences to de ne a feature vector that captures the ngerprint of anti-forensic tampering of LCA. Furthermore, we propose a detection method to expose image regions containing anti-forensically manipulated lateral chromatic aberrations. To do this, we calculate our proposed ngerprint-feature vector in an image region, and then conduct a statistical test to determine whether the ngerprint is indicative of an anti-forensically forged region.
BACKGROUND
When capturing an image, light from a scene is focused onto an optical sensor using a lens. However, the refractive index of glass is dependent on wavelength of light passing through it. is causes the di erent wavelengths of a light ray, originating from the same point source in a scene, to be focused onto laterally o set locations is e ect is called lateral chromatic aberration (LCA), which manifests as color fringes around object edges in an image. Fig. 1 shows a ray tracing diagram depicting LCA, which shows the red and blue components of an incoming ray of light being focused onto o set sensor locations.
Johnson and Farid developed a model to characterize the e ect of LCA [6] , which maps a focal point location r = [r 
e comparison color channel is viewed as an expanded or contracted version of the reference color channel, with the expansion coe cient α determining the expansion/contraction scaling factor. Note that the optical center ζ need not be the image geometric center. Speci cation of which channels are used as reference and comparison are typically le out of notation to maintain generality, but are made explicit in the text where necessary.
e displacement vector between reference focal point r and its corresponding focal point in the comparison channel c is useful for characterizing LCA. Gloe et al. developed a method to estimate localized LCA displacement vectors in a digital image, as well as a method to estimate the LCA model tuple θ from these local displacement estimates [3] . Research has shown that localized inconsistencies of LCA displacement from the global model of displacement can be used to expose cut-and-paste image forgeries [6, 12] , since the LCA displacement in the forged content is not consistent with the original image.
LCA Anti-Forensics
Work in [11] showed that the lateral chromatic aberration in a forged image region can be modi ed to hide traces of cut-and-paste tampering. is is accomplished by changing the LCA within the forged region to be consistent with the rest of the image. To change the LCA within the forged regions, the color channels of the forged image region are scaled and shi ed, which changes the spatial relationships of focal points across color channels.
e speci c scaling and shi ing to be applied to the forged image region was determined so that its LCA displacements are consistent with the rest of the image. To do this, a transformation was introduced that relates the desired anti-forensicly modi ed focal point location in a comparison color channel c to its current location c, such that e transformation rst removes the inherent LCA parameterized by the source expansion coe cient α S and source optical center ζ S . en, new focal point relationships are arti cially induced by a resampling operation, parameterized by the destination image expansion coe cient α D and virtual optical center ζ V , a constant determined by the relationship of the forged image region to the destination optical center. e anti-forensic transformation equation can be rewri en to show that
where K is a constant related to the scaled di erences between the source and destination optical centers. at is, the transformation that relates the comparison channel coordinates in source content c, to it's anti-forensically modi ed version c , is simply a geometric scaling and shi . e scaling is determined by the ratio of the in the source image expansion coe cient α S , and destination image expansion coe cient α D . We call this ratio the anti-forensic scaling factor.
is scaling and shi is performed via interpolated resampling [11] . e resulting anti-forensically modi ed forged region has LCA that matches its host image. is can be seen in Fig. 2b , which shows the LCA displacement vectors in an anti-forensically forged image region that are consistent with the destination image. Compare this with the LCA in the naively forged version, as shown in 2a, where the LCA displacement vectors in the forged region are inconsistent with the rest of the image. spectral peaks that are related to JPEG blocking discontinuities, by examining amplitude and phase angle di erences across color channels at these spectral peaks. e amplitude and phase di erences are used as evidence of anti-forensic LCA manipulation.
Since anti-forensic LCA tampering is performed by a scaling and resampling operation, it follows that resampling detection techniques are useful for detecting anti-forensically forged images. However, the scaling factor used in LCA anti-forensics is too small to be detected by typical resampling detection methods, such as those in [7, 14] . Typically, resizing is detected using a construct called a p-map, which describes the probability that a pixel is a linear combination of its neighbors. Resizing introduces periodicity into the p-map, and the corresponding spectral peaks in the p-map FFT are used to expose resizing operations [7, 14] . However, at these small anti-forensic scaling factors, the resizing spectral peak in the resampling p-map is indiscernible from the naturally occuring low frequency content. is is seen in Fig. 3 , which shows the p-map FFT of an anti-forensically tampered image region. In this gure, the anti-forensic resizing peak in the anti-forensically modi ed red channel is indiscernible from low-frequency content and is undetectable by traditional peak detection methods. e e ects of LCA anti-forensics, however, are apparent in the spectral peaks related to JPEG blocking discontinuities. Spectral peaks related to JPEG blocking occur in the p-map frequency domain because pixel values are not linearly predictable across JPEG blocks, and thus have a relatively low p-map value. ese low p-map values occur every 8 pixels, and introduce distinct peaks in the pmap spectrum at ω = π 4 , π 2 , and 3π 4 [9] , which can be seen in Fig. 3 . When an image channel is anti-forensically modi ed, the channel is slightly resized through an interpolation operation. is consequently introduces correlations, albeit slight, in pixel values across the JPEG blocking grid. As a result, the p-map deviations that are typically observed at JPEG blocking boundaries are decreased.
us the spectral peaks related to JPEG blocking are reduced in antiforensically modi ed color channels. is e ect is seen in Fig. 3 , which shows the p-map FFT in the x direction (ω = 0) for three color channels, with the red channel anti-forensically modi ed. e JPEG spectral peaks in the anti-forensically modi ed red channel are small relative to the to unmodi ed green and blue channels.
In practice, an image is anti-forensically modi ed by keeping one color channel unmodi ed and applying the anti-forensic scaling and shi ing to the remaining two color channels [11] . e unmodi ed e JPEG blocking peak at (ω x ,ω ) = ( π 4 , 0) is shown. e precompressed image taken by a Canon SX500-IS has an antiforensically modi ed red channel using the green channel as the reference channel. Di erent window sizes W and antiforensic scaling factors α D /α S are examined. e windowed p-maps are zero padded to 4096×4096 before taking their FFT.
color channel is called the reference channel and the modi ed color channels are called the comparison color channels. As a result, an anti-forensically tampered image region will have JPEGblocking spectral peaks that are much smaller in the comparison color channels relative to the reference color channel. e e ect of LCA anti-forensics is detailed in Fig. 4 , which shows the spectral p-map FFT magnitude with di erent anti-forensic scaling factors and di erent inspection window sizes. e gures show the rst JPEG spectral peak in the x direction at ω x = π 4 , ω = 0 in both the red comparison channel and in the green reference channel. In authentic image regions, the spectral peak in the red (comparison) and green (reference) channels are nearly identical. e spectral peak in the comparison channel is reduced when LCA anti-forensics is applied with scaling factor 1.00033, and further reduced when the scaling factor is increased to 1.00066. Furthermore,
Session: Media Forensics & Counterforensics
IH&MMSec'17, June 20-22, 2017, Philadelphia, PA, USA the peak di erences are much more discernible at larger window sizes of 512 × 512 than 256 × 256. e spatial shi ing of color channels during LCA anti-forensic tampering also a ects the phase of the JPEG blocking grid. is manifests as phase angle di erences when comparing the phase angle of the reference channel to the phase angle of the antiforensically modi ed comparison channel. Fig. 5 shows phase angles in an authentic image patch and in the same image patch that has been anti-forensically modi ed. In the anti-forensically modi ed patch, the phase angles of the red comparison channel deviate from the phase angles of the green comparison channel. In the authentic image patch, the phase angles are well matched.
PROPOSED FINGERPRINT FEATURE VECTOR OF LCA ANTI-FORENSICS
To quantitatively capture the e ects of LCA anti-forensics we de ne a feature vector as follows. We measure the ratio of JPEG spectral peak magnitudes between the 1) red and green channels, 2) blue and green channels, and 3) red and blue channels. In authentic image regions, it is expected that these ratios are near unity whereas in anti-forensically tampered regions these ratios deviate signi cantly.
Since the choice of reference channel is unknown to an investigator, ratios between all three possible color channel pairs are considered. Additionally, the di erence in phase angle at the JPEG spectral peaks are measured for each of the three color channel pairings. In authentic image regions, it is expected that these phase angle di erences are near zero whereas in anti-forensically modi ed image regions these phase angle di erences deviate from zero. At a given peak location de ned by frequencies ω x and ω six ngerprint values are measured: three magnitude ratios and three phase angle di erences. ese six values are represented by the vector x ω x ,ω as follows,
Here, F ω x ,ω is the p-map FFT magnitude at frequency (ω x ,ω ), and ∠F ω x ,ω is the p-map FFT phase angle at frequency (ω x ,ω ). e subscripts R, G and B denote the red, green, and blue color channels respectively.
e ngerprint values are measured at six JPEG spectral peak frequencies (ω x ,ω ) = π 4 , 0 , π 2 , 0 , 3π 4 , 0 , 0, π 4 , 0, π 2 , and 0, 3π 4 . is yields six vectors that are then concatenate to form the full, proposed feature vector
(5) e full LCA anti-forensics feature vector X contains 36 values, comprised of 18 spectral peak magnitude ratios and 18 phase angle di erences. Examples of the ngerprint X are shown in Fig. 6 for authentic and anti-forensically modi ed image patches. Fig. 6a shows histograms of
, 0 , the rst ngerprint dimension. e authentic values are distributed near unity whereas values from anti-forensic patches are typically smaller, and are easily discriminated. Fig. 6b shows a sca er plot of dimensions
. e use of two (and more) dimensions increases discrimination.
PROPOSED DETECTION METHOD
To expose image regions that have undergone LCA anti-forensic manipulation, we propose a new detection method using the ngerprint described in Sec. 4. To do this, we de ne a hypothesis testing problem where under the null hypothesis H 0 the image patch has not undergone LCA anti-forensics, and under the alternative hypothesis, H 1 , the LCA in the image patch has anti-forensically modi ed. To describe patches under the null hypothesis, we build a statistical model of the LCA anti-forensic ngerprint in unmodi ed image regions. Fig 6a shows a histogram of X 1 , the rst dimension of the ngerprint feature vector, in authentic and anti-forensically modi ed image patches. We observe from this histogram that X 1 is distributed approximately Gaussian in authentic patches, with a mean near one. We model the entire ngerprint vector as a 36 dimensional random variable that is distributed Gaussian, with a mean vector µ, and covariance Σ. e probability density function p(X|H 0 ) of X in authentic patches is as follows:
e authentic distribution parameters mean, µ, and covariance, Σ, are estimated from image patches extracted from many JPEG compressed images that are known to have not been modi ed. Since the patch size e ects the ngerprint values, as seen in Fig. 6 , the authentic distribution parameters must be estimated separately for each patch/window size that is used.
e ngerprint feature vector under the alternative hypothesis depends upon the anti-forensically scaling factor. is is shown in Fig. 4 . Without knowing the anti-forensic scaling factor, which requires knowledge of the source image, it is impractical to model the ngerprint feature in anti-forensically manipulated patches. As a result, we are le only to compare with authentic model. In antiforensically forged image patches, the ngerprint feature vector deviates signi cantly from µ. is e ect is seen in Fig. 6b , where a sca er plot of features X 1 and X 19 shows that the ngerprint in anti-forensically modi ed patches deviates signi cantly from the ngerprint in authentic patches.
To quantify the deviations of X from the authentic model of the ngerprint feature, we use the Mahalanobis distance [17] , which is as follows:
e distance m describes deviations of the ngerprint vector X from the authentic distribution mean µ. Importantly, the Mahalanobis distance accounts for di erences in the variances of each of the ngerprint dimensions. at is, a deviation in a dimension with a small variance is more indicative of manipulation than an equivalent deviation in a dimension with a large variance. e di erences in variances are normalized by the Σ −1 term in (7) . Additionally, the Mahalanobis distance accounts for any correlations that may exist among the authentic ngerprint dimensions.
e distance m is small in authentic image patches, and large in anti-forensically tampered image patches. We use this to de ne a decision rule δ (·) to determine if an image patch authentic or anti-forensically modi ed. e decision rule employs a threshold test, where distances m greater than or equal to the threshold τ reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
e decision threshold τ can be varied to set the false alarm rate. Figure 7: ROC curves of the proposed detection method on di erent block sizes. Forgeries were made by copying and pasting image blocks from database images, and antiforensically modifying their LCA to hide forgery traces.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We conducted a series of experiments in order to evaluate the e cacy of our proposed ngerprint and proposed detection method at exposing image patches that have been manipulated by LCA anti-forensics. To do this, we started with a database of images 16961 unaltered, JPEG compressed images from the Dresden Image Database [2] . We used all images from the "Natural images" set, which were captured by 27 unique camera models and representing a diverse set of LCA expansion coe cients. We produced 20000 cutand-paste forged images and anti-forensically tampered the forged regions to hide traces of LCA inconsistency. To make the cut-andpaste forgeries, we randomly chose a source image to cut from, and randomly chose a destination image to paste into. e source (cut) and destination (paste) locations were chosen at random, as well. To make each forgery, a 512 × 512 block was cut from the source location in the source image, and pasted at the destination location in the destination image. e LCA model parameters for the destination and source images were estimated using Gloe et al. 's e cient method [3] . Finally, LCA anti-forensics was applied using Mayer and Stamm's method [11] , using the green channel as the reference channel and the red and blue channels as the comparison channel.
e LCA anti-forensics ngerprint was calculated in each of the 512 × 512 forged image regions. Furthermore, to evaluate the e ect of inspection window size, the forged image regions were segmented into 4 non-overlapping 256 × 256 patches, as well as 16 non-overlapping 128 × 128 patches and the anti-forensic ngerprint was determined for each patch. To measure the anti-forensic ngerprint, we rst determined the resampling p-map FFT for each color plane in the image region, using the method described in [7] . Finally, the anti-forensics ngerprint X was determined, its distance m to the authentic model was calculated according to 7, and classi cation decision δ (m) rendered according to (8) .
To estimate the authentic model parameters, 100000 unmodi ed image patches of size 512 × 512, 256 × 256, and 128 × 128 were chosen. e LCA anti-forensics ngerprint was measured in each of the 300000 authentic patches (100000 patches for each of 3 window sizes). At each size, 10000 patches were randomly chosen to estimate the authentic ngerprint distribution parameters mean Figure 8: Probability of detection versus LCA anti-forensic scaling at a 5% false alarm rate.
µ, and covariance Σ. e remaining 90000 patches were used to determine false alarm rates at varied decision thresholds. Fig. 7 shows the receiver operator characteristic for our proposed detection method. At a 10% false alarm rate, our method achieved a 85% positive detection rate when using a 512 × 512 inspection window, demonstrating that our proposed ngerprint feature vector and detection method are able to successfully expose image patches as having been manipulated with LCA anti-forensics. At a smaller window size of 256 × 256, our detection method achieved a 71% positive detection rate, and a 52% positive detection rate with the smallest 128 × 128 window. At a 5% false alarm rate, our method achieved a 73%, 50%, and 31% positive detection rate at window sizes of 512 × 512, 256 × 256, and 128 × 128 respectively.
Furthermore, we evaluated the e ect of the scaling factor used in the LCA anti-forensic tampering process on detection performance. Fig. 8 shows the detection rates at a 5% false alarm rate as a function of anti-forensic scaling factor. For each forgery, we determined the anti-forensic scaling factor applied for each of the two comparison color channels and determined its absolute distance from 1 (no scaling). e x-axis of Fig. 8 includes all forgeries with at least one of the two anti-forensic scaling factors greater than the x axis value.
is method gives a measure of "strength" of LCA anti-forensics. For example, a scaling factor value of 0.0005 indicates that at least one of the red or blue comparison channels were scaled by either greater than 1.0005, or less than 0.9995.
At a scaling factor value of 0.0005, anti-forensically tampered patches were correctly identi ed at a rate of 95% with a window size of 512 × 512, 79% with a window size of 256 × 256, and 53% with a window size of 128 × 128. At a scaling factor value of 0.001, anti-forensically tampered patches were correctly identi ed at a rate of 99% with a window size of 512 × 512, 91% with a window size of 256 × 256, and 62% with a window size of 128 × 128. is result demonstrates that the strength of the LCA anti-forensic tampering greatly e ects its ability to be detected.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for securing digital images against anti-forensic manipulation of LCA. To do this, we exploit resizing di erences between color channels, which are induced by LCA anti-forensics, and de ne a feature vector to quantitatively capture these di erences. Furthermore, we propose a detection method that exposes anti-forensically manipulated image patches. e proposed algorithm is validated through experimental procedure, showing dependence on patch size as well as anti-forensic scaling factor.
